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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARM MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vsRICHARD KAY and
MYRTLE L. KAY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12300

APP'ELLANT''S REP'LY BRIEF
The statement of the nature of the case, the disposition in the lower court, relief sought on appeal and statement of facts have heretofore been set forth in appellant's brief, and are not, therefore, set forth herein.
Appellant does desire to clarify some facts set forth
tn the respondent Richard Kay's brief in refutation
thereof.
ARGUMENT
On page 4 and in the last paragraph thereof of
respondent's brief respondent has stated:
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company through
said attorneys filed an answer and proceeded to
1

prepare their case for trial which included interviewing
.client, Myrtle
Kay, and obtaining
her uncond1t10nal cooperation and confidence.
Citing Myrtle Kay's deposition, P. 31, L. 21.
This is not true, and Myrtle Kay's deposition does
not so state. State Farm Mutual's counsel did not contact Myrtle Kay, and her deposition on page 32 at line 3
states:
It seemed to me like someone else took the statement, but now it could have been Mr. Bowcutt.
I could look back and check back, maybe, and
find out.

As a matter of fact, counsel for the insurance company did not contact Mrs. Kay at any time until her
deposition was taken in the declaratory action on the
27th of August, 1970. There is no evidence to the contrary.
On page 5 of respondent's brief and in the last sentence of the last paragraph on said page respondent has
stated that State Farm and Richard Kay were prepared
to go to trial. This statement is not true, and there is
no evidence that State Farm was prepared to go to trial
at that time. Our file reflects that we notified State Farm
Mutual on the 22nd of September, 1969, that we had
received the deposition, and we sent the bill to them for
payment, and on the 26th of September we reviewed the
deposition for them. On the 9th of October the case was
set for trial on January 12, 1970 without any pre-trial
before Judge Nelson at the request of plaintiff Richard
Kay's counsel who, in fact, obtained a very early setting.
2

On page 5 of respondent's brief respondent has stated
that Strong & Hanni are still counsel of record for
Myrtle Kay in the case filed against her by her son,
Richard Kay, but this is not true. On March 25, 1970
Strong & Hanni filed a notice of withdrawal as counsel
for Myrtle Kay in the personal injury action as indicated
on page 4 of the respondent Myrtle Kay's brief and as
is reflected in the court file.
Respondent's brief cites numerous cases without any
statement of the facts involved therein, and we will comment upon the cases with reference to the pages in which
they are set forth in respondent's brief. On page 7 of
respondent Richard Kay's brief he has set out two citations, one from 38 A.LR. 2d at page 1151 and one from
7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile Insurance § 171 at page 503.
The significant portion of these citations would appear
to be:
A liability insurer who assumes and conducts the
defense of an action brought against the insured
with know ledge of facts taking the accident or
injury outside the coverage of the policy and without disclaiming liability or giving notice of reservation of its rights to deny coverage, is thereafter precluded in an action upon the policy from
setting up the defense of non-coverage.
These citations must be considered in the light of
the cases which counsel cites in support of the citations.
On page 9 of respondent's brief he cites the Utah
case of Harding v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 28
P.2d 182, 83 Utah 376, a 1934 case. In this case the in-
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surance company misled the insured by making payments to him and lulling him into a sense of security
until after the statute of limitations had run on his claim
'
at which time the company attempted to deny the insured' s right to recover. There was actual prejudice to
the insured in this case, and the court held that the insurance company was estopped.
On page 11 of respondent's brief he cites the case of

Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 436 P.2d 228, 20 Utah 2d
193. In this case again there was actual prejudice to the
insured created by the insurance company sending out
confusing statements as to the amount of premium which
the insured was required to pay. The insured made payment of the amount he interpreted the instructions to
require which turned out to be wrong, and the court
held that the insured was covered when an accident occurred because the insurance company had misled the
insured into believing that he was complying with the
requests of the company.
On page 13 of respondent's brief he cites the case
of Salerno vs. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 336
F.2d 14 (8th Circuit, 1964). This case is not in point in
the case now before the court because in the Salerno
case, Supra, the insurance company allowed the suit
against the insured to go to judgment before the insured
company filed a declaratory action. In this case, therefore, the insurance company did assume, conduct and
control the defense of the insured's action to a judgment
prior to declaring non-coverage under the policy.
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On page 16 in Camire vs. Commercial Insurance
Co., cited by respondent, and found at 198 A. 2d 168 a
Maine case, again the insurance company did not raise
its policy defense until after judgment, and the court in
that case held the loss of the right to control and manage one's own case is itself a prejudice.
On the same page respondent cites Ebert v. Balter
and Allstate Insurance Co., 83 N.J.S. 545, 200 A. 2d 542.
This case is not in point at all. The court held that
Allstate Insurance Company had not received reasonable
notice of the occurrence of the accident from the insured
and, therefore, did not have any duty to defend. Counsel
for State Farm Mutual was unable to find in the case
of Ebert v. Balter, supra, the language set forth in quotes
on pages 16 and 17 of respondent's brief.
On page 18 of respondent's brief he cites Merchant's
Indemnity Corporation of New York vs. Eggleston, 179
A. 2d page 535 (New Jersey, 1962). In this case the
facts were that the insurer had complete knowledge of
facts giving rise to a defense but continued unequivocably to treat the policy as operative and to undertake
defense of the insured. Counsel for the insurance company had full knowledge from two sets of statements
taken by the insurance company by different adjusters
from the insured and the insured's driver setting forth
the full facts and with this knowledge filed an answer,
called the insured, and the driver in to answer two sets
of interrogatories, also submitted interrogatories to plaintiff's counsel, filed a third-party complaint against another driver, alleged to have been instrumental in caus-
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mg the accident, appeared for the insured's and the insured's driver's deposition and appeared at a pre-trial
conference before disclaiming coverage.
On page 19 of respondent's brief he cites the case
of Rice vs. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456
P.2d 159, a 1969 case. In this case actual prejudice occurred because the adjuster for the insurance company
led the claimant against the insurance company to believe
that the insurance company would pay the claim right
until the statute of limitations ran and then denied the
claim. Our Supreme Court held that there was actual
prejudice shown and the insurance company was estopped
to claim the statute of limitations.
On page 20 of respondent's brief he cites the case
of Pendleton v. Pan American Fire and Casualty Co., 317
F.2d 96 (10th Circuit, N. M., 1963). The facts in this
case were that the insurance company completed the dis·
covery procedures and conducted the trial for a period of
two weeks before negotiating a settlement and then after
settlement of the case tried to disclaim coverage.
On page 21 the respondent cites New Jersey Fidelity
and Plate Glass Insurance Co. v. McGillis, (Utah), 42
F.2d 789 (10th Circuit). In that case the case went to
judgment, and the defense on the appeal was failure to
cooperate and collusion.
On page 22 respondent cites the case of Traders
and General Insurance Co. v. Rubeo Oil and Gas Co.,
129 F.2d 621 (10th Circuit). The facts were in this case
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that there was actual coverage of the injuries involved
and no policy defense, although the company denied
coverage. The insurance company did enter into the
defense of the case but refused to settle on behalf of the
insured when the insured received a good offer of settlement, and the insured, therefore, made a settlement
on his own behalf without permission of the insurance
company. The insurance company filed a declaratory
action to determine the question of coverage in the initial
suit and also raised the defense that the insured, contrary
to the policy, made a settlement without permission of
the insurance company. The court held that the insurance company acted in bad faith and their defense that
the insured made settlement without the permission of
the insurance company was not valid because of their
bad faith.
In the case of Tomerling v. Canadian Indemnity Co.,
394 P.2d 571, (Calif., 1964) cited by respondent on page
23, the company did not attempt to deny coverage until
after the judgment had been entered. The company was
properly estopped in that case from asserting its coverage
defense.
Respondent Myrtle Kay's brief cites generally the
same cases and citations from texts that respondent
Richard Kay has cited and our comments are applicable
to that brief.
The rule relied upon by the respondents:
That a liability insurer, with knowledge of a
ground of forfeiture or non-coverage under the
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policy, which assumes and conducts the defense
of an action brought against the insured, without
disclaiming liability and giving notice of a reservation of its rights, is thereafter precluded in an
action upon the policy from setting up such ground
of forfeiture or non-coverage,
1s not applicable to a situation such as that we have in
the State Farm Mutual v. Myrtle Kay and Richard Kay
case because, (1) the company did not have full knowledge of the facts under which Myrtle Kay and her son
Richard occupied the same household, and (2) the rule
relied upon by respondent's counsel in accordance with
the cases cited by respondent's apply only where the
insurer has controlled and conducted the defense of the
insured's case to the point of judgment or settlement
which in this case is not the fact, and ( 3) there has rn
fact been no prejudice to the insured Myrtle Kay.
Plaintiff would also like to draw the court's attention to the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Snyder, et al., (Georgia Court of Appeals,
Sept. 8, 1970) Case No. 6744 1970 Automobile Insurance
Cases CCH at page 10305. This was an action for a
declaratory judgment in which the insurer appeals from
the denial of its motion for summary judgment. The
defendants were all the parties in an impending negligence action which the insurer was defending under a
reservation of rights.
The insured was George Harned. The insured party
was his mother-in-law, Mrs. Snyder who was riding as
a guest in the Harned automobile driven by her daughter,
8

Peggy. The issue on appeal was whether, as a matter of
law, Mrs. Snyder was a member of the family of the
insured residing in the same household as the insured
so as to exclude coverage for bodily injury liability under
the terms of the policy.
The deposition and affidavits of the defendants
show: At the time of the accident Mrs. Snyder and the
Harneds lived under the same roof in a one family house
owned by George. The ground floor contained the living room, dining room, den, bedroom, kitchen and bathroom. The second floor had two rooms, furnished and
used exclusively by Mrs. Snyder as a sitting room and
as a bedroom. The Harneds similarly furnished and used
exclusively the ground floor rooms except for the kitchen
and bathroom which were shared. Mrs. Snyder carried
her own towel and toilet articles to and from the bathroom when she used it. Each of the women had her own
stove and utensils in the kitchen and used them exclusively in food preparation. There was only one refrigerator but separate shelves were allocated. The one washing machine was also used in separate shifts. Mrs. Snyder
was employed full time and went out to work every
day. She paid $15.00 a week to the Harneds as rent.
She bought her own groceries and household supplies,
prepared her own meals and ate them alone in the kitchen
on a completely different schedule from the Harneds.
She spent the evenings in her own sitting room watching
her own television set.
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On this set of facts the court held that there was a
close blood relationship such as exists in cases where
they have held the individual to be a member of the
family and a resident of the household. Nevertheless,
under the particular circumstances of this case while the
plaintiff occupied the same household, she, in fact, had
a separate domestic establishment within the household.
The court said a common roof is not the controlling element. Citing 12 Couch on Insurance (2d) 495, §45.520.
It is rather a conclusion based on the aggregate details
of the living arrangements of the parties.
This case contains an excellent discussion of the reason for the particular clause in the insurance policy involved in this case pertaining to the exclusion of coverage
for a resident of the same household.
The case is cited by counsel herein for the purpose
of showing that even though Mrs. Kay and Richard Kay
may have had the same address, it does not necessarily
follow that the exclusion in the policy applied. It was
necessary for counsel to get the facts by deposition of
Richard Kay whose statement had not been taken, to
establish the details of the household relationship between
himself and his mother.
It is respectfully submitted that the summary judgments granted in favor of the defendants in this case
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should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company.
Respectfully submitted,
L. L. SUMMERHAYS of

STRONG & HANNI

604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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